Fallen Heroes

In order to facilitate a suitable atmosphere for the foreign governments to carry out the crack down, it was important to brand the LTTE as a 'terrorist' organisation internationally, while hiding the extreme atrocities being committed against and the human sufferings being inflicted on the Tamil people as a direct result of the government's war effort. A costly disinformation campaign was launched internationally to achieve the former target, while a ban on journalists visiting the war theatre and harsh press censorship was imposed to achieve the latter. The "placing" of selected and doctored "news items" in the world press and manipulation of certain foreign journalists to publish highly biased "analyses" of the Tamil struggle reached such heights that blatantly unprofessional editorials to brand the LTTE as "a bunch of fanatical terrorists" began to appear even in prestigious newspapers like "The Times" in the UK. (This bears similar hallmarks to the now well-known global media manipulation preceding the Gulf War). Certain false stories presented at military press-briefings to demonise the LTTE were freely disseminated all over the world as "facts". (In fact, the LTTE leadership issued a strong statement protesting against this phenomenon in August 96.)

Lakshman Kadiragamar's efforts to get the international support to cover the remaining gap, i.e. the flow of funds from Tamil expatriates, seemed successful as the Canadian and Swiss governments moved to arrest the leaders of LTTE organisations in those two countries. The Tamil refugee population was highest in Canada and Switzerland and consequently the greatest financial backing for the LTTE also came from Tamils living in these two countries. Therefore, it might not have been accidental that the international effort to cut off the LTTE's financial life-line started there. In fact, it looked intriguingly as though there was a sort of international 'conspiracy' among the governments of Sri Lanka, Delhi and the rich countries to try and crush the leadership of the Tamil struggle.

Now let me summarise the main elements in the Sri Lankan government's military strategy:

a) To capture at least a substantial portion of the Jaffna peninsula, dismantle the LTTE's de facto government there, and in the process destroy a sizeable portion of the LTTE cadres and set up a military administration in the North.

b) To launch a similar operation in the East to force the remaining LTTE cadres there to the jungles in Vanni.

c) To launch another military operation from Elephant Pass, through Paranthan and Kilinochchi to secure a supply route linking the occupied territory in the North with the South.

d) To restrict the LTTE cadres to Vanni jungles and steadily strangle them by effectively cutting off their armaments and financial life-lines from abroad.

It is probably true that the government would have been delighted if it could get the political package, which splits the Tamil homeland and protects Sinhala domination at the Centre, approved in parliament. That certainly would have been extremely useful in misleading the international community during its war effort to demolish the Tamil struggle. But, it was the divisions within the Sinhala political establishment (for purely opportunistic reasons) which prevented that happening.

It is obvious that the UNP, realising that the very war-hysteria and chauvinism whipped up by the government is working against the package, has been trying its best to avoid any association with it as long as possible. The government too, sensing the opportunistic motives of the Opposition, has begun to backslide from the political package fearing unpopularity within the Sinhala electorate and instead is concentrating purely on the military aspect, about which it was (until Mullativu) becoming increasingly confident.

The Tamil political parties in Colombo, who were being discredited among the Tamil people by the hour, kept insisting on a North/East merger if they were to accept the package. The PA government, dominated by the ultra-chauvinist SLFP, would never have agreed to this, and hence it was obviously in President Kumaratunga's interest too to postpone a parliamentary debate on the package until she concluded the war, i.e., crushed the LTTE. For, she knew that once the LTTE was out of the picture the so-called moderate Tamil parties' preferences would be effectively irrelevant. (This is why I do not include the political package in my description of the military's equation summarised above ).

In purely militaristic logic, the above mentioned strategy may sound solid. But then how was the LTTE able to launch its biggest ever attack on the Mullaitivu base, jeopardising all government calculations, just a short while after its biggest defeat.

The simple answer, I think, is the spiritual depth of national liberation struggles. This is the crucial factor missing from the government's military equation. Conventional military analysts tend to limit their enquiries to more tangible factors such as the unique logistical vulnerability of the Mullaitivu camp over-looked by the military leaders, the guerrilla-friendly jungle terrain in Mullaitivu as opposed to the open Jaffna-terrain favourable to conventional forces, the post-victorious complacency of the government troops etc., etc. Although it is true that such factors did play a significantly contributory role in making the Mullaitivu attack a dazzling success for the Tigers, they fail to explain the unique immensity of the accomplishment so soon after a demoralising retreat. (I deliberately used the term "retreat" instead of "defeat" to highlight the fact that the government troops' occupation of the Jaffna peninsula did not involve a great victory for the military in a physical sense, but, it merely forced the LTTE forces to make a tactical withdrawal keeping its cadres, weaponry and the leadership intact). Arguably, the most plausible way to explain such inimitable achievements is to acknowledge the incomparable resolve and commitment of national liberation fighters to sacrifice their lives for a deeply felt cause. (The heroism of the LTTE forces can usefully be compared with the large scale desertions presently taking place within the Sri Lankan army). Military analysts' failure to differentiate guerrilla forces fighting national liberation struggles from guerrilla groups in general is extremely misleading indeed. It would be strategically and politically prudent to understand that there is a world of difference between guerrillas fighting a national liberation struggle from their home-ground against an alien army and guerrillas fighting, for example, a civil war to overthrow a government from within.

Liberation fighters throughout the world have routinely turned defeats into bigger victories. Defeat only strengthens their resolve to rise again. Whatever the obstacles conventional military strategists pose they will always find ways of overcoming them. There will be no shortage of cadres to continue the struggle as long as the relevant nation exists. As history has shown, all national liberation struggles have either ended up victoriously for the liberationists or else dragged on inconclusively causing economic ruin and political chaos to the countries concerned. There can be no military solutions to such struggles; only political solutions. Hi-tech war efforts can only delay the final outcome, i.e. the victory of the liberation fighters. Unless of course the adversary is capable of wiping out the entire nation.

In Sri Lanka there are some who would be quite happy to consider that last option. But judging from the level of military and political maturity the Tamil struggle and its leadership have reached, and judging from the rapidity with which national consciousness has strengthened among the Tamil people, and judging from the economic and political vulnerability Sri Lanka has reached as a direct result of the war, and judging from the deepening divisions within the Sinhala political establishment, any attempts in that direction could only accelerate the already gathering momentum which is plunging Sri Lanka towards an economic and political Black Hole.

Gen. Anurudda Ratwatta's attempts to underplay the significance of the Mullaitivu catastrophe by saying "In every military campaign, some battles are lost and others won" (Daily News, 8 Aug 1996) could prove to be a fatal mistake for the government; for, more than anything else, it demonstrated the unique potential of national liberation struggles as opposed to conventional warfare.

Perhaps it is not accidental that Gen. Ratwatta, in his statement on the Mullaitivu debacle to the parliament, has chosen not to dwell upon the possible reasons for the shocking magnitude of the Mullaitivu attack which has ridiculed all his insights into LTTE's post-Riviresa vulnerability. Instead he chose to limit his analysis to provide possible reasons as to why the LTTE launched this attack. According to Ratwatta, Mullaitivu attack was "a last ditch attempt to recover their lost prestige, and thereby (to boost up) their sources of income", and also "to prevent the troops from marching (from Elephant Pass) towards the South of the mainland".

A more honest attempt to find out what went wrong with his military vision would have been an eye-opener for many Sinhala chauvinists to see that it would be in the interest of the Sinhala South to find some formula to stop the war as soon as possible, withdraw the Sinhala troops from the Tamil homeland, and re-start negotiations with the LTTE with a genuine view to achieve peace with justice.

12 Aug 1996

Part-1